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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has juri sdi ction pi irsuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and the order of the Utah Supreme Court 
transferring this cases, to the Court of Appeals. 
This is an appeal from a judgment based on ai 1 order granting 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment against Appellant. 
STATEMENT 05 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was Respondent entitled to summary judgment based upon 
the record before the Court at the time it submitted its motion 
for summary judgment for decision? In particular, did that record 
establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regardi rig the agency of Defendant Gary I .„ Bentley to act for 
Defendant S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. at the time of an auction 
sale of Respondent's personal property? 
2. Did Appe] 3 ai it pr oper] y oppose Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment so as to create a genuine issue of material fact? 
a Was Appellant entitled to rely on its denials of 
Respondent's request • for admission to create a fact issue? 
b Were Appellant's second memorandum in opposition to 
the motion for summary judgment, and the affidavits that 
accompanied i t, filed timely so as to become par t of the record on. 
which the motion for summary judgment could be decided? 
Was the out-of-court statement by Frank Trunzo 
(that Bentley was solely responsible for the auction), reported in 
the affidavit of Harold L. Petersen, an admission by a party-
1 
opponent within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and hence admissible evidence? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's attorney's oral request, unsupported by any affidavit, 
to apply Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to deny 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum A. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: See Addendum B. 
Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay 
if: 
• • • • 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement 
of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement 
by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope 
of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten (10) days after service of a motion, but no later 
than five (5) days before the date of hearing, a statement 
[sic] answering points and authorities and counter-
affidavits. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Respondent The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company ("Mountain Bell")1 filed this action on January 28, 1988, 
to recover the net proceeds ($47,705.64) of an auction of its 
vehicles and equipment conducted by Defendants Gary L. Bentley 
("Bentley") and/or S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. ("the Trunzo 
Company")2 pursuant to a written contract between Mountain Bell 
and the Trunzo Company (R. 2-28). It also sought to recover 
against Appellant Old Republic Insurance Company ("Old Republic") 
as surety on an auctioneer's license bond issued in favor of 
Mountain Bell as obligee, with the Trunzo Company as principal, in 
the penal amount of $45,000.00 (R. 2-28). 
Although all defendants were served with process (R. 29-41, 
43-45), only Old Republic filed an answer (R. 61-67); accordingly, 
default judgments were entered against Bentley (R. 46-47) and the 
Trunzo Company (R. 55-56). 
Discovery consisted principally of a set of interrogatories 
1
 At all times material to this action, Appellant did 
business under the assumed name "Mountain Bell." In August, 1988, 
the assumed name was changed to "U S WEST Communications." 
However, for purposes of this case, the former name "Mountain 
Bell" will be used to maintain consistency with the use of that 
name in the record. 
2
 To distinguish between Defendant S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and its president, Frank Trunzo, in this 
brief, the corporation will be referred to as "the Trunzo 
Company," and the president will be referred to as "Frank Trunzo." 
References in the record to "Trunzo" may mean either the Trunzo 
Company or Frank Trunzo, depending on the context. 
3 
and request for production of documents served by Old Republic on 
Mountain Bell on or about July 7, 1988 (R. 74-77), and a set of 
requests for admission, interrogatories, and request for 
production of documents served by Mountain Bell on each of the 
defendants on or about July 15, 1988 (R. 88-90, 117-46, 212-36, 
237-61). Although Mountain Bell responded to Old Republic's 
discovery request (R. 94), no defendant responded to Mountain 
Bell's request. 
On November 18, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a motion for 
summary judgment against Old Republic, based in part on the 
failure to respond to the requests for admission (R. 102-16). The 
motion was also supported by the affidavits of Walter Williams 
(R. 149-84) and Josephine Briggs (R. 95-101). In response to the 
motion, on November 29, 1988, Old Republic served its responses to 
Mountain Bell's request for admissions (R. 185-86), and filed a 
motion to withdraw or amend the admissions (R. 193-95, 187-92) and 
a memorandum in opposition to Mountain Bell's motion for summary 
judgment (R. 196-99), but failed to file any opposing affidavit. 
Although Mountain Bell filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Old Republic's motion to withdraw admissions (R. 203-61) and a 
motion to strike the responses to Mountain Bell's requests 
(R. 201-02) on December 5, 1988,3 the district court, sua sponte, 
had already entered a minute entry on the same date granting Old 
J
 Mountain Bell also filed a reply memorandum (R. 272-88) and 
a request to submit its motion for summary judgment for decision 
(R. 267-69), along with a supplemental affidavit of Walter 
Williams (R. 262-66), on the same date. 
4 
Republic's motion to withdraw the admissions and permitting 
Mountain Bell to "re-notice" its summary judgment motion following 
the amendment of the response to Mountain Bell's admissions 
(R. 200, 289, 290, 293-94). 
On December 12, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a renewed request 
to submit its motion for summary judgment for decision (R. 291-
92). On December 27, 1988, Old Republic filed a second memorandum 
in opposition to that motion (R. 299-319), together with the 
affidavits of Myrel G. Mitchell (R. 314-16) and Harold L. 
Petersen (R. 317-19, 323-26).4 Mountain Bell filed a motion to 
strike the memorandum and affidavits on December 28, 1988 
(R. 327-29). 
Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment was argued 
January 23, 1989. At the hearing, Old Republic's counsel orally 
requested the court to deny Mountain Bell's motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that it had been unable to locate Frank 
Trunzo, the president of the Trunzo Company (Tr. 17), but did not 
then or thereafter submit any affidavit to establish that fact. 
Following the oral argument, the court granted Mountain Bell's 
motion for summary judgment from the bench (R. 341, Tr. 18). 
Judgment was entered accordingly on February 6, 1989 (R. 347-48). 
Old Republic filed its notice of appeal on March 6, 1989 
(R. 351-52). 
The affidavit of Harold Petersen is attached as Addendum D. 
5 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The procedural facts that are important to this appeal are 
set forth in the preceding section. Since the principal issues in 
this appeal revolve around what evidence was properly part of the 
record on which Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment was 
based, this section will distinguish between the facts that it 
contends were properly established, and the additional facts that 
Old Republic has asserted but which Mountain Bell contends should 
not have been considered by the trial court. 
At the time Mountain Bell resubmitted its motion for summary 
judgment for decision (the time for submission of opposing 
memoranda and affidavits having expired), the affidavits then on 
file5 established the following pertinent facts:6 
1. Mountain Bell had used the auctioneer services of the 
Trunzo Company, pursuant to a written contract, exclusively since 
1982, including at least 10 auctions involving over $400,000.00 
worth of equipment (Williams Aff. ft 3, R. 150, 155-70; Williams 
Supp. Aff. f 6, R. 264). In all of the auctions since September, 
5
 Those affidavits consist of the original and supplemental 
affidavits of Walter Williams (R. 149-84, 262-66) and the 
affidavit of Josephine Briggs (R. 95-101), but do not include the 
affidavits of Harold Peterson (R. 323-26) and Myrel Mitchell 
(R. 314-16), which were filed at least fifteen days after Mountain 
Bell re-noticed its motion for decision (R. 291-92). 
6
 Since the only substantive issue addressed by Old Republic 
in this appeal is the agency of Bentley to act for the Trunzo 
Company in the October 10, 1987 auction, only those facts that 
relate directly to that issue will be set forth in the text. Old 
Republic has apparently conceded that if Bentley is held to be the 
agent of the Trunzo Company, it is liable on the auctioneer's 
license bond that it, as surety, issued in favor of Mountain Bell, 
as obligee, with the Trunzo Company as principal. 
6 
1984, Bentley acted as the representative of the Trunzo Company 
(Williams Aff. f 9, R. 151; Williams Supp. Aff. ff 4-6, R. 263-
64). Mountain Bell's representative made all arrangements for the 
auctions through Bentley, and Bentley personally assisted in 
picking up the items to be auctioned and in conducting the 
auctions (Williams Supp. Aff. 1 4, R. 263). He also directed 
other employees of the Trunzo Company in connection with those 
auctions, executed receipts on behalf of the Trunzo Company, 
arranged for advertisements and other publicity for the auctions, 
and arranged for the accounting and record keeping with respect to 
the last two auctions (Williams Supp. Aff. f 4, R. 263). 
2. Not only did Bentley tell Mountain Bell's representative 
that he was the vice-president of the Trunzo Company7 (Williams 
Supp. Aff. f 5, R. 263), but Frank Trunzo, the president of the 
Trunzo Company, made like representations (Williams Supp. Aff. 
f 7, R. 264). Furthermore, although Frank Trunzo met with the 
Mountain Bell representative on numerous occasions during the 
period from 1984 through 1987, he never indicated that Bentley was 
not authorized to arrange auctions for the Trunzo Company, 
although he obviously knew that Bentley was doing so (Williams 
Supp. Aff. f 7, R. 264-65). 
3. Bentley executed a license bond on behalf of the Trunzo 
Company, as principal, in favor of Mountain Bell, as obligee, 
which was countersigned by Old Republic's authorized agent, Myrel 
7
 Affidavits from other actions pending in the Third District 
Court confirmed that Bentley held himself out as a vice president 
of the Trunzo Company (R. 280-88). 
7 
G. Mitchell (Williams Aff. 1 8, R. 151, 181-82). 
4. With respect to the auction in question, which was held 
on October 10, 1987, Mountain Bell's representative contacted 
Bentley, representing the Trunzo Company, and requested him to 
pick up the items to be auctioned, which he did (Williams Aff. 
ff 10, 11, R. 151). Not only did Bentley participate in 
conducting the auction, but Frank Trunzo did so as well (Williams 
Aff. ff 13-14, R. 152). The auction was held at the auction yard 
of the Trunzo Company, at which a sign appeared reading "S.F. 
Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc." (Williams Aff. f 13, R. 152). 
5. Both Bentley and Frank Trunzo assured Mountain Bell's 
representative that the Trunzo Company would conduct the auction, 
and that no sale or disposition of the Trunzo Company's assets 
would occur until after the auction (Williams Aff. % 12, 
R. 151-52). 
6. The unanswered requests for admission served on Bentley 
(R. 237-61) and the Trunzo Company (R. 212-236) establish 
conclusively, as to those parties, that Bentley was an officer and 
agent of the Trunzo Company, acting within the scope of his 
authority, when he conducted the auction of Mountain Bell vehicles 
and equipment on October 10, 1987 (R. 219-20, 244-45). 
With respect to Bentley's agency, the late-filed memorandum, 
attachment,8 and affidavits submitted by Old Republic, if 
8
 Attached to the memorandum was a copy of a purported 
contract of sale of some of the Trunzo Company's assets to 
Bentley. Old Republic did not provide any affidavit to 
authenticate the document, even after Mountain Bell moved to 
strike it for lack of authentication under Rule 901, Utah R. Evid. 
8 
considered, would tend to establish only the following: 
A. The Trunzo Company, Frank Trunzo, and Bentley entered an 
agreement dated July 8, 1987, for the sale of some, but not all, 
of the Trunzo Company's assets (R. 299, 303-13). Those assets did 
not include the Trunzo Company's rights under the contract with 
Mountain Bell9 (R. 303-04). There is no evidence that the sale 
was ever completed, nor that any attempt was made to obtain 
Mountain Bell's consent to assign the auction contract to Bentley. 
B. Frank Trunzo told Harold Peterson, Old Republic's first 
attorney of record in this case, that "following the sale of the 
S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. assets to Bentley, Bentley was not 
authorized to act as an agent for S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers."10 
(Peterson Aff. f 5, R. 324) . There is no indication whether Frank 
Trunzo told Mr. Peterson when or whether the sale was ever 
completed. 
C. Frank Trunzo also told Harold Peterson that Trunzo had 
informed Mountain Bell's representative, Walter Williams, that 
"Mr. Trunzo was selling his business to Gary Bentley and further 
that Bentley was solely responsible for the October 10, 1987, 
auction where Mountain Bell's equipment was allegedly auctioned." 
9
 Only "assignable" auction contracts were to be purchased by 
Bentley (R. 303). Mountain Bell's contract with the Trunzo 
Company specifically prohibited assignment without the prior 
written consent of Mountain Bell (R. 163). There is no evidence 
that the Trunzo Company sought to assign the Mountain Bell 
contract to Bentley, much less that Mountain Bell consented to 
such an assignment. 
1 0
 The agreement provided for the sale to be completed on 
July 8, 1988, some nine months after the auction of October 10, 
1987 (R. 304-05). 
9 
(Peterson Aff. If 6, R. 324). Again, there is no indication that 
Frank Trunzo told Mr. Peterson when or if the sale was completed, 
nor does the statement indicate whether Frank Trunzo made the 
alleged statement to Mountain Bell's agent before or after the 
auction. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The record properly before the court established Mountain 
Bell's right to summary judgment. The Rule 36 constructive 
admissions of the Trunzo Company and Bentley conclusively 
established that Bentley was the Trunzo Company's agent, acting 
within the scope of his authority, when he conducted the auction 
in question. Williams' affidavits also establish both actual and 
apparent agency, by showing a long course of dealing with Bentley 
as the Trunzo Company's agent, representations by both the Trunzo 
Company and Bentley that he was an agent, and that Frank Trunzo, 
the Trunzo Company's president, participated with Bentley in the 
auction in question, which was conducted on the premises of the 
Trunzo Company. 
2. Old Republic's opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Reliance on denials of requests for admission is 
insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The 
affidavits filed by Old Republic were not timely, and no excuse 
was offered for their tardiness, nor was leave sought to permit 
them to be filed late or to be considered. Even if considered, 
10 
the affidavit of Harold Peterson does not raise a question of 
fact, because the out-of-court statement of Frank Trunzo, reported 
in the affidavit, is inadmissible hearsay. It does not constitute 
an admission by a party-opponent because it was not offered 
against the declarant. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting 
Old Republic's verbal request to deny summary judgment on the 
basis of Rule 56(f), where no affidavit was filed stating the 
reasons why Old Republic could not procure counter-affidavits, and 
where Old Republic was not pursuing further discovery in the case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MOUNTAIN BELL PROPERLY ESTABLISHED THE AGENCY OF BENTLEY 
TO ACT FOR THE TRUNZO COMPANY. 
Under agency law, an agent can make its principal responsible 
for the agent's actions if the agent is acting pursuant to either 
actual or apparent authority. See generally Restatement (Second) 
of Agency §§ 26, 27 (1958). Actual authority may be express or 
implied. Id. at § 7, comment c. The admissible evidence properly 
before the court at the time Mountain Bell re-noticed its motion 
for summary judgment for decision established that Bentley had 
both actual and apparent authority from the Trunzo Company to 
conduct the auction of October 10, 1987. 
A. Bentley had actual authority. 
The evidence of Bentley's actual authority consisted of the 
following: (1) the unanswered requests for admission to Bentley 
11 
and the Trunzo Company,11 and (2) the original and supplemental 
affidavits of Walter Williams, Mountain Bell's representative12 
(Re 212-36, 237-61, 149-84, 262-66). The requests for admission 
establish conclusively, as to Bentley and the Trunzo Company, that 
Bentley had actual agency to bind the Trunzo Company. The 
Williams affidavits establish that a long course of dealing 
existed between Mountain Bell and the Trunzo Company, with Bentley 
consistently acting as the Trunzo Company's agent; that Frank 
Trunzo, the undisputed president of the Trunzo Compciny, 
represented to Mountain Bell's agent that Bentley was authorized 
to conduct auctions on behalf of the Trunzo Company; and that 
Frank Trunzo also participated with Bentley in conducting the 
October 10, 1987 auction, which was held at the Trunzo Company's 
auction yard, where a sign identifying the Trunzo Company was 
prominently displayed. 
1 1
 The requests that are pertinent to the agency issue are as 
follows: 
"13. Admit that Gary L. Bentley was authorized by Trunzo 
[the Trunzo Company] to sign the license bond on behalf of Trunzo. 
14. Admit that Bentley signed the license bond on behalf of 
Trunzo. 
. . . . 
18. Admit that in conducting an auction of Mountain Bell 
vehicles and equipment on or about October 10, 1987, Bentley acted 
as an agent of Trunzo. 
19. Admit that in conducting an auction of Mountain Bell 
vehicles and equipment on or about October 10, 1987, Bentley acted 
within the scope of his authority as an agent of Trunzo. 
20. Admit that during the discovery period, Bentley was an 
officer of Trunzo. 
21. Admit that during the time Bentley was an officer of 
Trunzo, he had authority to conduct auctions on behalf of Trunzo." 
(R. 219-20, 244-45). 
1 2
 The affidavits of Walter Williams are attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
12 
The unanswered requests for admission propounded to the 
Trunzo Company and to Bentley created a judicial admission by 
those parties that Bentley was acting as the Trunzo Company's 
agent at the time of the auction.13 "This has the effect of 
withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need 
for proof of fact." D. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 262 (1972). 
A judicial admission is distinct from an evidential admission. 
"The judicial admission, unless it should be allowed by the court 
to be withdrawn, is conclusive, whereas the evidential admission 
is not conclusive . . . ." Id. Rule 36(b) provides that "[a]ny 
matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless 
the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission." While Rule 36 admissions are only binding against the 
parties to whom they were directed, e.g., Riberalass v. Techni-
Glass Industries, Inc., 811 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1987); In re 
Leonetti, 28 B.R. 1003, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and hence are not 
conclusively binding on Old Republic, they do prevent the Trunzo 
Company and Bentley from contradicting the matters admitted. 
Furthermore, Rule 36 admissions may be used to support a motion 
1J
 Rule 36(a) permits requests for admission to be served 
"upon any other party." A defaulted party is nonetheless a party. 
See Rule 55(a), Utah R. Civ. Proc. Therefore, Mountain Bell was 
entitled to serve requests for admission upon the Trunzo Company 
and Bentley, even though default had been entered against them. 
Rule 36(a) also provides: 
The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after 
service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time 
as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is 
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a 
written answer or objection addressed to the matter . . . . 
Therefore, the unanswered requests to the Trunzo Company and 
Bentley were deemed admitted. 
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for summary judgment. See Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. Proc.; Schmitt 
v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). Therefore, as far as the 
Trunzo Company and Bentley were concerned, it is conclusively 
established that agency existed. Since those parties constitute 
both the principal and the agent, their admissions constitute 
powerful evidence of the agency, even as to Old Republic. 
Additional evidence also establishes that Bentley had actual 
authority from the Trunzo Company. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
''The actual authority of an agent may be implied from the 
words and conduct of the parties and the facts and 
circumstances attending the transaction in question . . . . 
Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to 
an agent, such authority carries with it, by implication, 
authority to do collateral acts which are the natural and 
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized." 
Bowen v. 01sen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978). In the present 
case, Walter Williams' affidavits establish that the Trunzo 
Company had entrusted Bentley with authority to conduct and 
perform all auctions of Mountain Bell property for over three 
years. The Trunzo Company does not dispute that Bentley was an 
authorized agent for previous auctions, and the affidavit of 
Walter Williams, together with the admissions of the Trunzo 
Company, establish that actual authority existed for the auction 
in question. 
B. Bentley had apparent authority. 
The evidence before the court also established that Bentley 
had apparent authority. Apparent authority is shown by the 
conduct of the principal approving or ratifying the acts of the 
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agent. See Zion's First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 
P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). Frank Trunzo, as president of the 
Trunzo Company, created such an appearance of things that Mountain 
Bell could reasonably believe that Bentley had apparent authority 
to act for and on behalf of the Trunzo Company. Frank Trunzo knew 
that Bentley was conducting the auctions and allowed him to do so. 
His participation with Bentley in selling Mountain Bell's vehicles 
in the October 10, 1987 auction makes it reasonable to conclude 
that Bentley had proper authority. Furthermore, Frank Trunzo 
specifically told Mountain Bell's representative that the October 
10, 1987 auction would be conducted by the Trunzo Company 
(R. 152). Thus the present case is distinguishable from the case 
cited by Old Republic. In City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-
Plymouth
 f 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the principal had absolutely no 
knowledge that his employees were charging personal supplies to 
the company's open account; hence there was no basis for finding 
apparent authority. 
The case of Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), 
cited by Old Republic, which provides that one who deals with an 
agent has the responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority, 
is also inapplicable. The lengthy course of dealings between 
Mountain Bell and Trunzo is adequate proof that Mountain Bell had 
ascertained the question of Bentley's authority. A course of 
dealing which recognizes a person's agency is evidence of the 
agency relationship. See e.g., O'Dav v. George Arakelian Farms, 
Inc., 540 P.2d 197, 199 (Ariz. App. 1975); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 
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v. Eniay Chemical Co., 316 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. 1974); Fox v. 
Morse. 96 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. 1959). 
Once apparent authority has been established, it continues as 
to a third party until the third party is put on notice that the 
agent's authority has been terminated.14 As stated in Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, § 129: 
Unless otherwise agreed, if the agent properly begins to deal 
with a third person and the principal has notice of this, the 
apparent authority to conduct the transaction is not 
terminated by the termination of the agent's authority by a 
cause other than incapacity or impossibility, unless the 
third person has notice of it. 
See also, Sorenson v. Shupe Bros. Co., 517 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1974) (holding the acts of the apparent agent binding on 
the principal as against a third party who had no notice of the 
termination of agency as a result of the sale of the business). 
None of the evidence in the record of this case at the time the 
motion for summary judgment was re-noticed indicated that Mountain 
Bell had notice of the termination of Bentley's agency. Indeed, 
the Williams affidavit confirmed the agency, where Williams 
testified that Frank Trunzo told him that the Trunzo Company would 
conduct the October 10, 1987 auction and that no sale of assets 
would take place until after that auction (R. 151-52). Under 
those circumstances, Williams' knowledge that a sale of assets was 
contemplated cannot imply notice of termination of the agency. 
1 4
 The case quoted by Old Republic actually strengthens this 
position. In Walker Bank and Trust Company v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73 
(Utah 1983), the court upheld summary judgment in favor of the 
bank, even though the defendant put the bank on notice that her 
husband was no longer authorized to use her credit card. 
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Finally, Old Republic argues that the question of apparent 
authority is not appropriate for summary judgment. The cases 
cited by Old Republic to support its contention are not 
applicable, because a factual issue had been properly raised in 
those cases. While Bailev v. Ness, 708 P.2d 900, 903 (Idaho 1985) 
correctly states that apparent authority is generally a question 
for the trier of fact "where the existence of agency is disputed" 
(emphasis added), another case cited by Old Republic illustrates 
that summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority is 
appropriate where the opposing party does not properly raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 
672 P.2d at 73. 
The record properly before the court conclusively establishes 
that Bentley had actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of 
the Trunzo Company. Mountain Bell was never given notice that 
Bentley might not have such authority on October 10, 1987. In 
fact, Williams was impliedly assured by Bentley and Trunzo that 
Bentley's authority would continue through the auction of the 
Mountain Bell equipment. Mountain Bell adequately established its 
right to summary judgment on the state of the record at the time 
it submitted its motion for decision. 
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II. OLD REPUBLIC FAILED TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE 
OF MATERIAL FACT ON THE QUESTION OF BENTLEY'S 
AGENCY. 
A. Old Republic was not entitled to relv solely on its 
denial of Mountain Bell/s request for admissions to 
defeat the motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, bv affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(emphasis added) At the time Mountain Bell submitted its motion 
for summary judgment for decision, Old Republic had filed no 
opposing affidavits, but relied solely on its denial of Mountain 
Bell's requests for admission relating to Bentley's agency.15 
However, the rule does not specify denials of requests for 
admission in its enumeration of items the court may consider on a 
motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) lists "pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any" as the materials the court 
is to consider in reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Rule 
56(e) further provides that "[t]he court may permit affidavits to 
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits." Nowhere does the rule 
permit a party to rely solely on denials of requests for 
admission. Cf. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) 
X:D
 Old Republic never filed its response to Mountain Bell's 
Request for Admissions, so it is not part of the record on appeal. 
18 
(opponent may not rely on denials of pleadings to avoid summary 
judgment.) Therefore, Old Republic's first memorandum in 
opposition to Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment did not 
properly oppose the motion. 
Old Republic also failed to file any counter-affidavit prior 
to the time that Mountain Bell originally submitted the motion for 
decision, nor did it do so prior to the time that Mountain Bell 
re-noticed its motion for decision. The Utah Supreme Court has 
frequently upheld summary judgment in similar cases where a party 
opposing the motion fails to file timely, proper affidavits. For 
example, in Briaham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 
(Utah 1987), the court affirmed a summary judgment for a 
deficiency after sale of repossessed property, where the plaintiff 
submitted an affidavit describing the manner of sale, and the 
defendant filed no counter-affidavit to show that the sale was 
commercially unreasonable. After observing that it "was incumbent 
upon defendant to adduce whatever material defenses he had to the 
entry of a deficiency judgment as a matter of law," the court 
concluded: "However, bare contentions, unsupported by any 
specifications of facts in support thereof, raise no material 
questions of fact. Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 
(Utah 1980)." 746 P.2d at 1173. 
In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), the court affirmed a summary judgment in 
favor of a seller on a real estate contract, holding lienholders' 
interests to be subordinate. In that case, the seller filed 
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affidavits setting forth the terms of the contract, the 
circumstances of default, and the relative priorities of the 
lienholders, but the defendants filed no opposing affidavits. 
After rejecting the defendants' claims that the plaintiff's 
affidavits were defective, the court stated: 
The opponent of the motion, once a prima facie case for 
summary judgment has been made, must file responsive 
affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial court's 
conclusion that there are no factual issues. . . Thus, when 
a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court 
may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of 
fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively 
discloses the existence of such an issue. Without such a 
showing, the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of 
the applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. 
659 P.2d at 1044. See also, Cowen and Company v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Company, 695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984). 
In Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United Resources, 
Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970), the court affirmed a 
summary judgment granting full faith and credit to an Arizona 
judgment, rejecting defendant's argument that the assertion of 
lack of jurisdiction in its answer was sufficient to raise a 
question of fact precluding summary judgment. The court also 
noted that the defendant had not provided any factual information 
in response to the plaintiff's specific interrogatory asking for 
the basis of defendant's contention of no jurisdiction. In the 
present case, Mountain Bell submitted interrogatories to Old 
Republic which requested Old Republic to state the basis for any 
denials of Mountain Bell's requests for admission (Interrog. #1), 
and to state the basis for its denial of paragraph 8 of the 
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Complaint, which alleged that Bentley was the Trunzo Company's 
agent in conducting the auction (Interrog. # 16) (R. 126, 129). 
Additionally, Mountain Bell's interrogatories 17 and 18 
specifically queried as follows: 
17. Do you claim that Bentley was not the authorized agent 
for Trunzo with respect to any of the facts alleged in 
plaintiff's Complaint? If so, state the basis for such a 
claim. 
18. Do you claim that Bentley, although an authorized agent 
for Trunzo, did not act within the scope of his authority 
with respect to any of the facts alleged in plaintiff's 
Complaint? If so, state the basis for such a claim. 
Not only did Old Republic not object to these interrogatories, as 
did the defendant in Transamerica. but it filed no response 
whatsoever. Under these circumstances, the court may and should 
properly conclude that there was no evidential support for Old 
Republic's claim of lack of agency at the time Mountain Bell 
submitted the motion for decision. 
B. Old Republic's second memorandum and affidavits in 
response to Mountain Bell's motion for summary 
judgment were untimely• 
Rule 4.501(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration states, 
"[t]he responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten (10) days after service of a motion, but no later than 
five (5) days before the date of hearing, a statement answering 
points and authorities and counter-affidavits.''16 Old Republic 
did not file any affidavits in opposition to Mountain Bell's 
lb
 Rule 4-501(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
superseded Rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of Practice on October 30, 
1988. Although Mountain Bell cited to Rule 2.8(b) in its motion 
to strike, the substance of both rules is identical. 
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motion for summary judgment until forty days after the motion was 
filed.17 Old Republic could not justify its delay in filing its 
affidavits, because all of the events reported in the affidavits 
occurred long before Mountain Bell filed its motion for summary 
judgment, and no explanation was given for the delay in procuring 
the affidavits. Old Republic did not move for leave to submit 
untimely affidavits, and Mountain Bell promptly moved to strike 
them. 
In Marcus Daly Memorial Hospital Corporation v. Borkoski, 624 
P.2d 997 (Mont. 1981), the court affirmed a summary judgment, 
rejecting the opponent's argument that the trial court erred in 
refusing to accept and consider his untimely affidavits and brief 
filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion. The court 
stated: 
The purchaser offered no compelling excuse for his untimely 
filing. When this untimely filing is considered with all the 
unwarranted delays already caused by the purchaser, it is 
clear that the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
in refusing to consider the affidavit. 
Id. at 1000. In the present case, Old Republic has not offered 
1 7
 Mountain Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on 
November 17, 1988. Old Republic filed its first memorandum 
opposing the motion, without any affidavits, on November 29, 1988. 
Mountain Bell's Renewed Request to Submit Motion for Summary 
Judgment for Decision, filed on or about December 12, 1988, does 
not constitute the filing of a new motion for summary judgment, 
but rather a request to submit the original motion for summary 
judgment for decision. Even it were considered a new motion for 
summary judgment, Old Republic still failed to file its second 
memorandum in opposition within the 10 day period, but waited 
until December 27, 1988, which was the first date on which it 
filed opposing affidavits, some 40 days after the motion for 
summary judgment was filed and 15 days after Mountain Bell re-
noticed the motion. 
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any excuse, much less a compelling one, for its untimely filing. 
Under these circumstances, the trial court was well within its 
discretion to refuse Old Republic's untimely affidavits.18 
Old Republic cites Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
750 P.2d 539, 540 (Utah 1988), which states that on appeal the 
court can only "sustain judgment if no issues of material fact 
which could affect the outcome can be discerned." Old Republic 
neglects to point out that on appeal the court can only consider 
the record that was properly before the trial court. In Pinckley 
v. Dr. Francisco Galleaos, M.D., P.A., 740 S.W.2d 529, 532 
(Tex.App. 1987), the court held that because the record did not 
affirmatively show acceptance of late filed affidavits by the 
trial court, it must presume non-acceptance. The court also 
stated: 
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
refuse to consider appellant's opposing affidavits which were 
not timely filed. . . . Because the appellant's 
controverting affidavits were not before the court, appellant 
cannot thereby raise fact issues on appeal to defeat the 
summary judgment. 
Id. at 532. Since Old Republic's affidavits were not timely 
filed, this court must presume that the trial court properly 
rejected them.19 
18
 Old Republic has not even claimed on appeal that the trial 
court erred in not accepting its tardy affidavits, but rather 
assumes without discussion that the affidavits were properly 
before the court. 
19
 "If, on a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party 
fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to have 
waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist." 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). Mountain Bell did not waive its 
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C. Even if considered, the affidavit of Harold 
Petersen does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact on the question of Bentlev#s agency. 
Old Republic argues that the statements of Frank Trunzo, 
reported in the affidavit of Harold Petersen, to the effect that 
Bentley was not an authorized agent of the Trunzo Company at the 
time of the auction, should be construed as admissions by a party-
opponent, under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Old 
Republic's reliance on that rule is misplaced. 
Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it 
is "offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in 
either his individual or a representative capacity . . . .» 
(emphasis added). The fundamental requirement of this rule is 
that the statement must be offered against the declarant's 
interest. "It is only when the admission is offered against the 
party who made it that it comes within the exception to the 
hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent." C. Wright & A. 
Miller, 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2264, at 741 (1970). The 
statement of Frank Trunzo tends to exonerate both the Trunzo 
Company and Old Republic from any liability. It is conspicuously 
self-serving and does not constitute an admission by a party-
opponent, because it was offered against Mountain Bell, not 
against the declarant. 
The cases cited by Old Republic affirm the adverse interest 
opposition to Old Republic's affidavits, because it immediately 
filed a motion to strike them as untimely and not containing 
admissible evidence. Old Republic, on the other hand, waived any 
objections it may have had to Mountain Bell's affidavits, because 
it neither moved to strike nor filed an objection to them. 
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requirement of an admission by a party-opponent. In Kekua v. 
Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 601 P.2d 364, 370 (Hawaii 1979), the 
court distinguishes a party admission from a statement against 
interest. "[P]arty admissions, unlike statements against 
interests, need not have been against the declarant's interest 
when made . . . ." Id. (emphasis added) Although a party 
admission need not be against the party when uttered, the rule 
explicitly requires that it must ultimately be offered against his 
interest before it can be introduced as evidence. 
Old Republic's quotation regarding out-of-court statements is 
also a distortion. In Jolley v. Clav. 646 P.2d 413, 417 (Id. 
1982), the court explains that "out-of-court statements of parties 
to litigation are admissible in evidence against the party." 
(emphasis added). The Kekua court also clearly explains that 
"extrajudicial statements of a party-opponent, when offered 
against the same, are universally deemed admissible at trial ...." 
601 P.2d at 371 (emphasis added). Because the statement of Frank 
Trunzo is not an admission by a party-opponent, it is no more than 
simple, inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, it fails the requirement 
of Rule 56(e) that affidavits set forth "such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence." Hence it does not create a genuine issue 
of material fact on the question of Bentley's agency and is 
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See McCarthy v. Yempuku. 
678 P.2d 11, 17 (Hawaii App. 1984). 
Even if Frank Trunzo's statement were otherwise admissible, 
the trial court properly disregarded it because it contradicted 
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the judicial admission of the Trunzo Company that Bentley was its 
agent with respect to the October 10, 1987 auction. Rule 36 
admissions "conclusively" establish the matter requested, and 
cannot be circumvented by other evidence, unless leave is first 
obtained to withdraw or amend the admission. See W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner v. Park West Village Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977). In 
Gardner, the court held that an affidavit denying agency, which 
was filed three days before the hearing on a motion for summary 
judgment, was insufficient to create an issue of fact, where 
deemed admissions established the agency and no motion was made to 
withdraw the admissions. 
In the present case, no effort was ever made by any defendant 
to withdraw the Trunzo Company#s deemed admissions. The 
gratuitous, self-serving, out-of-court statement by its president, 
made after default judgment had already been entered against it, 
and reported by the attorney for the bonding company that is 
seeking to hold him personally liable for its obligation (R. 57-
60), does not have any indicia of trustworthiness (see Rule 
804(5), Utah R. Evid.) and should not be allowed to avoid the 
effects of Rule 36(b). Therefore, Harold Peterson's affidavit is 
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat 
Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment. 
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III. OLD REPUBLIC DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR APPLICATION OF RULE 56(f), UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The trial court properly refused to apply Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to deny summary judgment. Rule 
56(f) provides: 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from 
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(emphasis added). Rule 56(f) is only applicable when an opposing 
party raises by affidavit reasons for his inability to oppose a 
motion by affidavit. Old Republic failed to file any such 
affidavit, either before, during, or after the hearing on Mountain 
Bell/s Motion for Summary Judgment. Its sole basis for the 
request to apply Rule 56(f) was its attorney's statement at the 
hearing: 
We have not been able to locate Mr. Trunzo since the 
interview with Mr. Peterson. We have tried. We had an 
address and telephone for him in Pittsburgh. 
Tr. 17. This statement, as well as the affidavit of Harold 
Peterson, shows that, in fact, Old Republic had been in direct 
contact with Frank Trunzo as early as May of 1988 (some six months 
before Mountain Bell filed its motion for summary judgment), when 
he was interviewed in Old Republic's attorney's office. Old 
Republic missed a golden opportunity to obtain an affidavit or 
deposition from Frank Trunzo at that time. Old Republic's 
attorneys should have recognized that since default judgment had 
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already been entered against the Trunzo Company, there was no 
incentive for Frank Trunzo to remain in the state or to make 
himself available for further discovery or the trial. Old 
Republic has offered no explanation why it did not obtain the 
sworn testimony of Frank Trunzo when it had the chance, either by 
affidavit or by deposition. 
The case cited by Old Republic concerning Rule 56(f) is 
distinguishable. In Crutchfield v. Hart, 630 P.2d 124 (Hawaii 
App. 1981) the appellate court reversed the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment for the defendant because the time for discovery 
in that case was relatively short, the plaintiff had not yet 
completed discovery, and the plaintiff had asked the court for 
additional time to conduct discovery. In the present case, there 
was ample time for discovery, and Old Republic had apparently 
completed its discovery three months before Mountain Bell filed 
its motion for summary judgment. In Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc.. 110 Utah Adv. Rep 53 (Utah App., filed June 9, 1989), this 
court affirmed a summary judgment under similar circumstances, 
where the opponent had not filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit, but 
claimed she had not been permitted to complete discovery. In that 
case, the court noted that the opponent had not conducted any 
discovery during the six months prior to the motion. See also. 
Jackson v. Lavton City. 743 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1987) (court 
refused to consider an argument that additional discovery was 
necessary where no Rule 56(f) affidavit was filed); Reeves v. 
Geicry Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988); 
28 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 840-42 (Utah App. 
1987). In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing the oral request of Old Republic under Rule 
56(f), unsupported by any affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Mountain Bell requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm 
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Mountain Bell. 
The evidence properly before the court established Bentley's 
agency, and hence Mountain Bell's right to judgment as a matter of 
law. Old Republic failed to create a genuine issue of fact, both 
by failing to file opposing affidavits timely, and by relying on 
inadmissible evidence in its tardy affidavits. The trial judge's 
decision was proper on the record and well within the bounds of 
his judicial discretion, and should not be disturbed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of June, 1989. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
By^y^x/>6wfe^^^ 
Floyd^A. Jensen, Attorney 
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ADDENDA 
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Affidavit of Walter Williams Without 
Exhibits and Supplemental Affidavit of 
Walter Williams 
Affidavit of Harold L. Petersen 
Judgment 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 36 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a 
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of 
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request 
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, 
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The 
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the 
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admit-
ted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of 
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are 
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request 
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement 
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons 
and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the 
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by 
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defen-
dant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration 
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection 
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party 
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admis-
sion is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny 
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or 
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtain-
able by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a 
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth 
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an 
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court 
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition 
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to 
trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred 
in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclu-
sively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amend-
ment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amend-
ment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that with-
drawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the 
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
ADDENDUM B 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
ADDENDUM C 
Affidavit of Walter Williams Without 
Exhibits and Supplemental Affidavit of 
Walter Williams 
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Esq. (Bar # 1672) 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
fdba MOUNTAIN BELL : Civil No. C88-534 
v. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual : WALTER J. WILLIAMS 
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL; : 
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC., : HON. DAVID S. YOUNG 
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD : 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
a corporation : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Walter J. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am and at all times material to this action was 
employed by U S West Business Resources, Inc., fka U S West 
Materiel Resources, Inc. ("U S West MRI"), an affiliate of 
Plaintiff The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, fdba Mountain Bell, in the position of Manager -
Reclamation. My duties as such included the supervision of 
disposal of certain personal property of Mountain Bell under 
a contract between Mountain Bell and U S West MRI. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein, and am competent to testify thereto. 
NOV IS 1933 
3. Mountain Bell and S.F. Trunzo Antiques and Auctions, 
Inc. (hereinafter "Trunzo") entered into a contract for 
auctioneer services on about September 6, 1982. A copy of 
the contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and will be 
referred to hereinafter as the "Trunzo Contract." S.F. 
Trunzo Antiques and Auctions, Inc. later changed its name to 
"S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc." (See Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto, which is a certified copy of the records on file with 
the Utah Secretary of State's office relating to the 
corporation.) 
4. In my position with U S West MRI, I was responsible 
for, and therefore actually did, administer the Trunzo 
Contract on behalf of Mountain Bell. 
5. The Trunzo Contract remained in full force and 
effect through at least October 10, 1982, and was the only 
source of authority under which Trunzo was permitted to 
auction personal property of Mountain Bell during that 
period. Mountain Bell did not use or employ any other 
auctioneer of its personal property in Utah during that 
period. 
6. To satisfy the security requirements of the Trunzo 
Contract, Trunzo furnished a bond to Mountain Bell. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true copy of a 
bond executed by Frank Trunzo on behalf of Trunzo, and by 
Myrel G. Mitchell, as attorney in fact for the surety, Old 
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Republic Insurance Company, to provide security to Mountain 
Bell for Trunzo's performance under the Trunzo Contract. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true copy of a 
bond executed by Gary L. Bentley on behalf of Trunzo, and by 
Myrel G. Mitchell, as attorney in fact for the surety, Old 
Republic Insurance Company, to provide security to Mountain 
Bell for Trunzo's performance under the Trunzo Contract. 
9. As far as I knew and understood, Gary L. Bentley was 
an officer and agent of Trunzo, and in all transactions and 
arrangements involving the auction of Mountain Bell property, 
I always dealt with him in his capacity as such. 
10. During the summer and early fall of 1987, I 
requested Gary L. Bentley, representing Trunzo, to pick up 
several vehicles and items of equipment belonging to Mountain 
Bell and to auction the same pursuant to the Trunzo Contract. 
Representatives of Trunzo did pick up the specified vehicles 
and equipment. For each item received, an authorized 
representative of Trunzo was required to sign a document 
entitled "Receipt of Vehicles and Equipment for Auction," a 
sample copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
11. Pursuant to the Trunzo Contract, I arranged with 
Gary L. Bentley, representing Trunzo, for the vehicles and 
equipment to be auctioned by Trunzo on October 10, 1987. 
12. In the weeks preceding the October 10, 1987 
auction, Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley informed me that the 
assets of Trunzo would be sold to Bentley International after 
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the auction was held. Both Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley 
repeatedly assured me that the auction would be conducted by 
Trunzo and that no sale or disposition of Trunzo's assets 
would occur until after the auction. 
13. The auction of Mountain Bell vehicles and equipment 
was held on October 10, 1987, on the premises of Trunzo at 
388 Hartwell Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. At all times 
during the auction, a sign hung above the auction yard 
reading "S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc." 
14. I attended the auction on October 10, 1987. I 
observed both Frank Trunzo and Gary Bentley auctioning the 
Mountain Bell vehicles and equipment. 
15. Neither Mountain Bell nor U S West MRI received any 
proceeds from the October 10, 1987 auction within seven 
working days after the auction, as required by t 3.D of the 
Trunzo Contract. 
16. I made many verbal demands on Trunzo, through its 
representative Gary L. Bentley, to remit the proceeds of the 
auction of October 10, 1987. Gary L. Bentley assured me on 
several occasions that the proceeds would be paid shortly. 
17. On or about October 29, 1987, I received a check 
for $47,705.64, representing the proceeds of the auction of 
October 10, 1987 after deducting the commission due Trunzo 
under the Trunzo Contract. The check was drawn on an account 
in the name of "Bentley International," and was signed by 
Gary L. Bentley. The check was dishonored upon presentment, 
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marked "Insufficient Funds/' and was returned to me, A copy 
of the check is attached hereto as Exhibit "F." 
19. To date, the check attached as Exhibit "F" has not 
been made good, nor has any payment of any part of the 
proceeds of the auction of October 10, 1987 been received by 
Mountain Bell or U S West MRI. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
A'JhJ AJLMJ 
Walter(3. Williams 
. 1/1* Subscribed and sworn to before me this /i?^ " day of 
November, 1987. fy (~ \ ~ 
My commission expires: 
>£// 0 HP 
Notary Public residing in Salt 
Lake County, UtatvO 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of Walter J. Williams was mailed, postage 
pre^id, to the following on the f l day of A//7V~, 
Harold L. Petersen, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Old Republic Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. 
3 88 West Hartwell Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Gary L. Bentley dba 
Bentley International aka 
Bentley International Auction Company 
3 88 West hartwell Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Esq. (Bar # 1672) 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
fdba MOUNTAIN BELL 
v. 
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual 
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL; 
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Walter J. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am and at all times material to this action was 
employed by U S West Business Resources, Inc., fka U S West 
Materiel Resources, Inc. ("U S West MRI"), an affiliate of 
Plaintiff The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, fdba Mountain Bell, in the position of Manager -
Reclamation. My duties as such included the supervision of 
disposal of certain personal property of Mountain Bell under 
a contract between Mountain Bell and U S West MRI. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein, and am competent to testify thereto. 
^ n :> 1333 




HON. DAVID S. YOUNG 
3. I previously signed an affidavit herein, entitled 
"Affidavit of Walter J. Williams." The purpose of this 
affidavit is to supplement the statements made in that 
affidavit, relative to my knowledge and observations of the 
relationship between Gary L. Bentley and S.F. Trunzo 
Auctioneers, Inc. (hereinafter "Trunzo"), with which company 
Mountain Bell had a contract for auctioneer services, as 
detailed in my previous affidavit. 
4. Commencing in September 1984, Gary L. Bentley was 
the principal point of contact between Mountain Bell and 
Trunzo with respect to all auctions conducted by Trunzo for 
Mountain Bell pursuant to the Trunzo Contract, as defined in 
my previous affidavit. I personally dealt with Bentley with 
respect to arrangements for and conduct ot each of such 
auctions, and Bentley always appeared to be in charge of each 
such auction. He personally picked up items to be auctioned 
or directed other employees of Trunzo to do so, executed 
receipts for such items, and arranged for advertisements and 
other publicity for the auctions. He also delivered the net 
proceeds of such auctions to me. In addition, with respect 
to at least the last two auctions, he arranged for the 
accounting and record keeping with respect to the auction 
sales. 
5. Gary L. Bentley told me on several occasions that he 
was the Vice President of Trunzo, and I believed him to be 
such. 
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6. Auctions of Mountain Bell property by Trunzo were 
held on the following days, resulting in net proceeds to 
Mountain Bell as indicated. In each instance, Gary L. 
Bentley was the representative of Trunzo who arranged for the 
auction as described in Paragraph 4 hereof, the auction was 
held at Trunzo's property at 388 West Hartwell Ave., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and the revenue was paid over to Mountain 
Bell by means of checks drawn on Trunzo's bank account (with 
the exception of the last auction). 
Auction Date Net Proceeds of Sale 
Sept. 15, 1984 $ 118,776.18 
Feb. 16, 1985 $ 56,785.62 
June 15, 1985 $ 14,713.25 
Oct. 9, 1985 $ 25,541.50 
Nov. 16, 1985 $ 19,794.50 
Mar. 26, 1986 $ 14,306.67 
Aug. 9, 1986 $ 49,665.09 
Dec. 16, 1986 $ 55,132.42 
June 4, 1987 $ 15,522.18 
Oct. 10, 1987 ($ 47,705.64) 
7. Throughout the period indicated in the previous 
paragraph, I also met on numerous occasions with Frank 
Trunzo, the president of Trunzo, who told me that Bentley was 
the Vice President of Trunzo. Frank Trunzo never indicated 
that Bentley was not authorized to arrange auctions for 
-3-
Trunzo, although he obviously knew that Bentley was doing so, 
at least with respect to Mountain Bell property. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
DATED this / day of December, 1988. 
alter [/J. Williams 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / day of 
December, 198$. 
Notary Public residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Walter J. Williams was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following on the ?*aay oJ 
December, 1988: 
Joseph J. Joyce, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Old Republic Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. 
388 West HartweZl Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Gary L. Bentley dba 
Bentley International aka 
Bentley International Auction Company 
388 West hartwell Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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ADDENDUM D 
Affidavit of Harold L. Petersen 
Joseph J. Joyce, #4857 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Old Republic Insurance Co. 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
dba MOUNTAIN BELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual 
and dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL; 
S.F. TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and THE OLD 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD L. PETERSEN 
Civil No. C88-534 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ) 
COUNTY OF fehJUtO ) 
HAROLD L. PETERSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
states of Utah and Virginia. 
2. Up until July of 1987, I was the attorney of record 
in this matter for defendant The Old Republic Insurance Company. 
I was employed at the law firm of Strong & Hanni and was the 
attorney primarily responsible for the defense of The Old Republic 
Insurance Company. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, 
and am competent to testify thereto. 
4. On or about May 17, 1988, I interviewed Frank Trunzo 
personally in my offices at Strong & Hanni in Salt Lake City. 
The interview was tape recorded and a transcript of the interview 
was prepared. 
5. During said interview, Mr. Trunzo told me of the 
sale of S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers to Gary Bentley. Mr. Trunzo 
further told me that following the sale of the S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers, 
Inc. assets to Bentley, Bentley was not authorized to act as 
an agent for S.F. Trunzo Auctioneers. 
6. Mr. Trunzo also told me that he had informed Walter 
Williams on more than one occasion that Mr. Trunzo was selling 
his business to Gary Bentley and further that Bentley was solely respon-
sible for the October 10, 1987, auction where Mountain Bellfs 
equipment was allegedly auctioned. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this ^ £A day of December, 1988. 
ClIcgpid^L . ^ e i ( e r sen 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o be fore me t h i s &3d)'— day of 
December, 1988. 
Notary Pub$/1# - Res id ing a t : 
My Commission E x p i r e s : - £ , K ^ , " * . * , "^o o<W is y±£Uired. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this 
23rd day of December, 1988, to the following: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc. 
P. 0. Box 520082 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Gary L. Bentley dba 
Bentley International aka 
Bentley International Auction Company 
388 West Hartwell Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Wendy HQ Smart; Secretary 
ADDENDUM E 
Judgment 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney Bar #1672 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thira Judicial District 
FEB 6 1989 
DTLflKECCUNTl Y Deputy Clark 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, dba MOUNTAIN BELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY L. BENTLEY, an individual and 
dba BENTLEY INTERNATIONAL; S. F. 
TRUNZO AUCTIONEERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation and THE OLD REPUBLIC 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-534 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
£\^bb^ 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff be awarded Judgment against said 
defendant THE OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY in the amount of: 
$45,000.00 - Principal 
f$ y £f(*l.& - Accrued prejudgment interest from Dec (3f !*i£7 
—
;
 to date of Judgment 
$ 93.75 - Accrued costs to date of Judgment 
$ gO 0%,V> - TOTAL JUDGMENT, 
with interest on the total Judgment at twelve percent (12%) per 
annum as provided by law from the date of this Judgment until 
^ t~ r>*. - (-1 
paid, p lus a f te r -accru ing c o s t s . 
DATED t h i s _ j 2 _ d a y of &&&rfY, U2/89. 
BY THE COURT: 
David S. Yo 
District C 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVEPY 
I hereby certify that on this 7? day of January, 1989, I 
caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing Judgment to: 
Joseph J. Joyce, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Old Republic Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this Z-3 day of January, 1989, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Gary L. Bentley & 
dba Bentley International 
P.O. Box 201077 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
Frank Trunzo 
S. F. Trunzo Auctioneers, Inc, 
388 Hartwell Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841115 
